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PARTIAL ENFORCEMENT
If adopted the partial-enforcement doctrine will support the equi-
ties of each situation rather than mechanically apply legalistic rules of
interpretation. As stated in Ehlers, the result will be that the legitimate
interests of the covenantee will be protected without undue hardship to
the covenantor when the public interest is not adversely affected. 0 This
balancing of conflicting interests will enable the courts to dispense jus-
tice rather than act as legal technicians.
DAVID M. RAPP
Sales-Strict Liability For Breach of Warranty: Gore v. George J. Ball,
Inc.
As a general rule two parties may deal with each other as they wish,
and if their ensuing agreement is voluntarily and fairly entered into, it
will be enforceable in a court of law. However, this fundamental right
of freedom of contract is subject to the limitation, inter alia, that the
agreement may not be against public policy. The vague and somewhat
amorphous concept of public policy has been applied by courts to invali-
date contracts which in the opinion of the court tend to be injurious to
the public welfare, to sound morality, or to the interests of society.' In
Gore v. George J. Ball, Inc.,2 the North Carolina Supreme Court re-
fused to enforce a limitation-of-damages clause in a contract between a
seed seller and a farmer because such a provision "is contrary to the
public policy of this State."'3
In 1965, using an order blank obtained from a George J. Ball, Inc.
catalogue, C. 0. Gore ordered four ounces of Heinz 1350 tomato seeds
at a cost of five dollars. Shortly thereafter Gore received from Ball
several packets of seed labeled "Heinz 1350 Tomato Seed." Included
contract or clause to be enforced according to any one of the three theories:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have
been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result.
OSee text accompanying note 27 supra.
'E.g., Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224 (1892); Perkins v. Hegg, 212 Minn. 377, 3
N.W.2d 671 (1942).
2279 N.C. 192, 182 S.E.2d 389 (1971).
31d. at 203, 182 S.E.2d at 395.
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on each package of seed, on the invoice delivered to Gore, and in the
seed catalogue was a clause purporting to limit Ball's liability for any
breach of warranty to the return of the buyer's purchase price. Gore
planted the tomato seeds, but when they germinated they produced not
Heinz 1350 tomatoes but a completely different variety "wholly un-
suited for sale for table use and useful only in the production of tomato
paste."4 After refusing to accept a refund of his five-dollar purchase
price, Gore filed suit against Ball alleging breaches of an express war-
ranty of description and of the implied warranty of fitness and seeking
to recover consequential damages, including lost profits.5
Justice Lake, writing for the North Carolina Supreme Court, found
that the defendant seed seller had warranted the seed contained in the
packets to be "Heinz 1350 tomato seed" and that delivery of a different
variety of seed by defendant constituted a breach of its contract.' The
court made no specific finding as to whether the limitation-of-damages
clause was incorporated into the contract but stated that even if it were
a part of the contract, it would not be enforceable because it was con-
trary to the public policy of North Carolina.
The Gore court noted that an agreement is against public policy
when it "tend[s] to the violation of a statute."7 In support of this propo-
sition the court cited Cauble v. Trexler,8 a case in which the North
Carolina Supreme Court refused to allow a foreclosure of a second
mortgage on farmland because the mortgage was violative of the pur-
pose of the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act of 1933.1 In that case a
federal land bank agreed to lend to a mortgagor-farm owner 2,600
dollars on the condition that the mortgagee would agree to accept this
amount as a full satisfaction of the farmer's debt. The mortgagee agreed
in writing to scale down the amount owed, but after receiving the money
he coerced the owner of the farm into giving him a second mortgage on
the balance of the debt. The North Carolina Supreme Court noted that
'Id. at 195, 182 S.E.2d at 390.
-The court noted that plaintiff's complaint was not a "model of clarity and precision as to
the theory upon which he relied." 279 N.C. at 198, 182 S.E.2d at 392. Plaintiff appears to have
alleged that defendant expressly warranted the seeds to be a specific kind and variety. In addition
plaintiff alleged the breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Both these
warranties must have arisen under the common law of North Carolina, if at all, because the
Uniform Commercial Code had not been enacted in North Carolina at the time of the transaction
in issue.
1279 N.C. at 200, 182 S.E.2d at 393.
VId. at 203, 182 S.E.2d at 395.
227 N.C. 307, 42 S.E.2d 77 (1947).
'Act of May 12, 1933, ch. 25, § 32, 48 Stat. 31.
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the primary object of the federal statute was to relieve farmers from
their load of oppressive debts, and thus any agreement in contravention
of the statute was void as against public policy.' 0 In another North
Carolina case, Courtney v. Parker," the court refused to allow recovery
by a building materials company on a contract because the company
was transacting business under an assumed name in direct violation of
a statute. The court stated:
It is well established that no recovery can be had on a contract
forbidden by the positive law of the state, and the principle prevails as
a general rule whether it is forbidden in express terms or by implication
arising from the fact that the transaction in question has been made
an indictable offense or subjected to the imposition of a penalty. 2
In Gore the court held that the limitation-of-damages clause was
contrary to the purpose of the North Carolina Seed Law. 3 This act
makes it unlawful
to sell, offer for sale or expose for sale within this State. . . vegetable
seeds...
c. Not labeled in accordance with the provisions of this article or
having a false or misleading labeling or claim.
j. To which there is affixed names or terms that create a misleading
impression as to the . . . kind and variety, .... quality or origin of
the seeds.'4
The violation of any provision of the act is a misdemeanor punishable
by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars. 5 According to the court,
this statute was intended to protect farmers against the disastrous conse-
quences of the sale and delivery to them of falsely labeled seed. 6 Thus,
the underlying policy of the statute would forbid enforcement of a
limitation-of-damages clause in a seed sales contract.
The court in Gore could have grounded its refusal to enforce the
objectionable clause on alternative legal theories. It might have said as
the South Carolina Supreme Court did in Stevenson v. B. B. Kirkland
10227 N.C. at 311, 42 S.E.2d at 80-81.
"173 N.C. 479, 92 S.E. 324 (1917).
'ld. at 480, 92 S.E. at 324.
'
3N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-277 to -277.28 (1966), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
"Id. § 106-277.9(1) (1966).
15 d. § 106-277.24 (1966).
1279 N.C. at 204, 182 S.E.2d at 396.
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Seed Co. 17 that the limitation-of-damages clause was not a part of the
agreement between the two parties. In Stevenson, in an analogous fact
situation, the South Carolina court stated that "the nonwarranty clause
printed in appellant's catalogue, on its invoice sheets, and on cards
inserted in its seed bags is immaterial. For such a clause to be applicable
in any case, it must be shown that it was brought to the attention of
the purchaser."'' 8 The court in Gore refused to decide that as a matter
of law the clause did not become a part of the agreement, stating that
even if it were a part of the contract it would be invalid.
The Gore court also rejected the reasoning of a Washington case,
Nakanishi v. Foster,9 in which defendant had sold mislabeled lettuce
seed. The court in Nakanishi found that the seller had violated the
provisions of a state statute (similar to the North Carolina Seed Law)
that regulated the selling and labeling of seed. Since the Washington act
was penal in nature and was enacted for the protection of the farmer,
the court found that defendant's violation of the statute constituted
negligence per se.20 The Gore decision disagreed with this analysis and
held that defendant's violation of the seed act could not be negligence
per se because the North Carolina Seed Law was not a safety statute.2 1
The North Carolina court in Gore avoided the reasoning in
Stevenson and Nakanishi in order to hold specifically that a limitation-
of-damages clause included by a seed seller in a sales contract is against
public policy. The court's holding, however, is based on a questionable
interpretation of the North Carolina Seed Law. The act explicitly ex-
empts from liability any person who sells
vegetable seeds which were incorrectly labeled or represented as to
origin, kind or variety when such seeds cannot be identified by exami-
nation thereof unless such person has failed to obtain an invoice or
'176 S.C. 345, 180 S.E. 197 (1935).
"Id. at 355, 180 S.E. at 201.
164 Wash. 2d 647, 393 P.2d 635 (1964).
2Id. at 656, 393 P.2d at 641; accord, Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514, 515 (Fla.
1953) (en bane).
21279 N.C. at 198, 182 S.E.2d at 392. The North Carolina court on numerous occasions has
stated that violation of a safety statute constitutes negligence per se. However, the violation must
be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. E.g., Bell v. Page, 271 N.C. 396, 156 S.E.2d 711
(1967); Reynolds v. Murph, 241 N.C. 60, 84 S.E.2d 273 (1954). A safety statute as defined by the
court is a law designed to protect the public from physical injury to person or property. See Byrd,
Proof of Negligence in North Carolina, 48 N.C.L. REv. 731, 746 (1970). The North Carolina Seed
Law, which the court itself says was designed to "protect farmers from ...disastrous consc-
quences," 279 N.C. at 204, 182 S.E.2d at 396, is not a safety statute apparently because its purpose
is only to protect an economic interest.
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grower's declaration giving origin, kind and variety or to take such
precautions as may be necessary to insure the identity to be that
stated."2
Ball's conduct fell within this exemption as the seed of the two varieties
of tomatoes were not distinguishable by physical inspection and Ball had
obtained from the grower an invoice showing the variety of the seed to
be Heinz 1350.23 The court admitted that defendant's activity was not
in violation of the statute. It stated, however, that the "provision ex-
empting the vendor, under the circumstances designated, from the pen-
alties imposed by the Act is not intended to absolve him from liability
to the purchaser for breach of contract.'2 4 This answer is unsatisfactory
because the question before the court was not whether defendant was
liable for his breach of contract, but whether he could successfully limit
his damages once the breach was established.25 The fact that the legisla-
ture exempted some activities from the penalties of the statute would
seem to imply that such conduct is not against the public policy of North
Carolina. In fact it is arguable that the legislature was explicitly provid-
ing a means by which seed retailers could comply with the provisions
of the statute and concomitantly protect themselves from liability.
Although Gore's conclusion that the limitation-of-damages clause
contravenes public policy is debatable, the court's analysis is significant
because it focuses attention on the inequitable nature of the contract.
Perhaps the court was suggesting that in the future such oppressive
terms will not be enforced in North Carolina. In essence, the Gore
opinion declares the limitation-of-damages clause to be unconscionable.
Such a result could be reached directly under the provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, which had not been enacted in North Caro-
lina at the time of the transaction between Gore and Ball. 2 The court
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-277.10(e) (1966).
"Gore v. George J. Ball, Inc., 10 N.C. App. 310, 312, 178 S.E.2d 237, 239 (1971). The court
of appeals in its discussion of negligence per se bypassed the question of whether the North
Carolina Seed Law was a safety statute and instead predicated its holding on the fact that defen-
dant did not violate the seed law. Id. at 313, 178 S.E.2d at 240.
2279 N.C. at 205-06, 182 S.E.2d at 397.
'2But see Zicari v. Joseph Harris Co., 33 App. Div. 2d 17, _ 304 N.Y.S.2d 918, 924-25
(1969), in which a New York court similarly confused the separate issues of liability for breach of
warranty and ability to contractually limit damages.
2The Uniform Commercial Code was enacted into positive law in North Carolina by the 1965
legislature and became effective on July 1, 1967. Ch. 700, §§ 1-11, [1965] N.C. Sess. L. 768
(codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-101 to -10-107 (1965), as amended, (Supp. 1971)). The
numbering of sections in the North Carolina Code corresponds to that used in the 1962 Official
Text of the Uniform Commercial Code, except that each number is preceded by the chapter
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in Gore, unable to rely on the statutory authority of the Code, had to
use the only tools it had available, and thus it declared the agreement
to be contrary to public policy.27
The Uniform Commercial Code allows a vendor and purchaser to
limit contractually the remedies available to the buyer for a breach of
warranty by the seller.2 The Code specifically states that the measure
of damages may be altered "by limiting the buyer's remedies to return
of the goods and repayment of the price." 9 This is precisely the Gore
situation. According to the Code, such a provision is binding on the
parties "unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable."3 Section
2-302 allows a court to find as a matter of law that the entire contract
or any clause in the contract is unconscionable .3 The Official Com-
ments to the Code note that section 2-302 was intended to allow a court
to pass directly on the unconscionability of a contract. "In the past such
number, "25." Thus, § 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code is § 25-2-302 of the North Caro-
lina Code. The Official Comments to the Code have never been enacted into positive law in North
Carolina. They are recorded in chapter 25 of the General Statutes, however, and presumably are
used by North Carolina courts in interpreting specific sections of the Code.
27The court was probably correct in its determination that it lacked the statutory authority to
directly invalidate a contract as unconscionable. At least one court, however, has held as a matter
of common law that an unconscionable contract is unenforceable. Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
Courts of equity have consistently refused to enforce unconscionable provisions in contracts.
See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948). Professor Pomeroy in his
treatise on equity jurisprudence states that
[t]he specific performance of a contract will be refused when . . . the contract itself is
unfair, one-sided, unconscionable, or affected by any other such inequitable feature, and
where the specific enforcement would be oppressive or harsh upon the defendant, or
would prevent the enjoyment of his own rights, or would in any manner work injustice.
4 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1405(a) (5th ed. 1941).
Z'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(4) [hereinafter cited as UCC].29UCC § 2-719(I)(a).
3
°UCC § 2-719(3). It may have been possible to invalidate the suspect clause in the Gore
contract without resorting to the unconscionability section of the Code. Section 2-719(2) imposes
a limitation of reasonableness on any damages which the parties have undertaken to regulate
consensually. This limitation applies "[w]here circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy
to fail of its essential purpose." UCC § 2-719(2). The Official Comment notes that the very essence
of a sales contract requires "that at least minimum adequate remedies be available." UCC § 2-
719, Comment 1. Arguably, the purchaser in Gore would be deprived of the entire benefit of his
bargain if the limitation-of-damages clause were enforced, and thus he would not have the mini-
mum adequate remedies which the Code requires. See also 1 W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL
GUIDE To THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 174-75 (1964).
31UCC § 2-302. This section was deleted when the Uniform Commercial Code was initially
enacted in North Carolina. However, the 1971 legislature incorporated the provision into the
statute and it became effective on October 1, 1971. Ch. 1055, § 1, [1971] N.C. Sess. L.- (codified
as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-302 (Supp. 1971)).
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policing has been accomplished by adverse construction of language, by
manipulation of the rules of offer and acceptance or by determinations
that the clause is contrary to public policy or to the dominant purpose
of the contract. '32
The Code offers no explicit definition of unconscionability, but the
Official Comment states that the principle is one of "prevention of
oppression and unfair surprise. ' 33 Since these two abuses appear most
often in contracts between two parties with unequal bargaining power,
it may be helpful to analyze unconscionability in terms of disparate
bargaining power. An oppressive contract may be defined as one in
which a stronger party forces a weaker party to accept terms which are
both burdensome and unjustified by commercial necessities. The weaker
party accepts the oppressive terms, although aware of the consequences,
because his bargaining power is such that he must do business on those
terms or not at all. 34 In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,35 a
case discussed in the Gore opinion, the New Jersey Supreme Court
refused to enforce this type of oppressive clause. In that case an automo-
bile owner sued the dealer and manufacturer to recover for personal
injuries and consequential damages to the auto incurred in an accident
caused by a defect in the car's steering mechanism. The defense was
based largely on a provision in the sales contract that limited the manu-
facturer's liability for breach of warranty to the replacement of defective
parts. The type of disclaimer in question was used not only by defen-
dant, Chrysler Corporation, but also by every other automobile manu-
facturer in the country.36 Thus, the automobile buyer lacked any mean-
ingful choice in the matter; he could either purchase a car and accept
the limitation clause or purchase no car at all. The Henningsen court
relied heavily on this factor in reaching its decision:
-UCC § 2-302, Comment I (emphasis added). See also Spanogle, Analyzing Unconsciona-
bility Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931 (1969), where the author states:
Unconscionable contracts and clauses have been surreptitiously invalidated for decades.
But surreptitious invalidation created problems. The courts did not usually invalidate
on the express ground that a particular clause or contract was unconscionable. Their
regard for "freedom of contract" prevented such a straightforward approach or any
explicit recognition of judicial control over the terms of a bargain. Instead, the courts
resorted to various formal, technical devices to achieve their ends.
Id. at 934 (footnote omitted).
"UCC § 2-302, Comment 1.
"See Comment, Bargaining Power and Unconscionability: A Suggested Approach to UCC
Section 2-302, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 998, 999 (1966).
-32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d.69 (1960).
'lId. at 390-91, 161 A.2d at 87.
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[The standardized mass contract] is used primarily by enterprises with
strong bargaining power and position. "The weaker party, in need of
the goods or services, is frequently not in a position to shop around
for better terms, either because the author of the standard contract has
a monopoly (natural or artificial) or because all competitors use the
same clauses. His contractual intention is but a subjection more or less
voluntary to terms dictated by the stronger party, terms whose conse-
quences are often understood in a vague way, if at all."37
In the seed-sale situation a buyer also has no meaningful choice. Appar-
ently all seed growers and retailers rely on the same or similar
limitation-of-damages provisions in their sales contracts." Thus, the
farmer in Gore was in a worse position than the auto buyer in
Henningsen because he could not afford the luxury of forgoing his
purchase. Economic realities dictated that he buy the seeds on whatever
terms they were available. The court noted that a breach of warranty
for an automobile part would not automatically cause harm to the
consumer, but the mislabeling of seed would unavoidably cause injury
to a farmer.39 "Loss of the intended crop is inevitable; the extent of the
disaster is measured only by the size of the farmer's planting."'"
The second element of unconscionability, unfair surprise, is per-
haps best demonstrated by the fine print contract that contains a
labyrinth of words and expressions defining the rights and obligations
of each party. In most situations the non-drafting party either fails to
read the fine print or is unable to comprehend the technical legal lan-
guage. In Henningsen the limitation-of-damages clause appeared on the
back of a sales contract and the buyer's attention was directed to it by
the smallest, least legible print in the entire document.4 The court con-
cluded that even if the consumer had read the clause, he would not
3Id. at 389, 161 A.2d at 86.
11279 N.C. at 202, 182 S.E.2d at 395.
Z1Id. at 208, 182 S.E.2d at 398. Of course it is possible that a better crop would result because
of the inadvertent supplying of a superior strain of seed which responds well to similar cultivation
methods.
The Gore court also failed to consider the fact that Henningsen dealt primarily with personal
injury. Traditionally, personal injury has been thought to be a much greater wrong than mere
economic injury. This distinction is evidenced by the fact that § 2-719(3) of the Code makes
limitation-of-damages for a personal injury prima facie unconscionable, but such a contractual
provision for commercial losses is allowed unless proved unconscionable.
10279 N.C. at 208, 182 S.E.2d at 398.
"132 N.J. at 365, 161 A.2d at 73. The Henningsen court caustically remarked that "[t]he
draftsmanship is reflective of the care and skill of the Automobile Manufacturers Association in
undertaking to avoid warranty obligations without drawing too much attention to its effort in that
regards." Id. at 400, 161 A.2d at 93.
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understand its legal ramifications. The Gore court questioned whether
a prospective seed purchaser would notice the suspect clause and under-
stand its legal implications. The opinion conceded that an experienced
lawyer would have understood the significance of the provision, but the
court felt that "most retail purchasers of seed are not experienced in the
art of discovering such phrases in the midst of language relating to other
matters. '42 While both Henningsen and Gore held the limitation-of-
damages clause to be against public policy, the citation of section 2-302
by the Henningsen court suggests that it felt the case presented the type
of abuses which that section of the Code was intended to prevent.4 3
A limitation-of-damages clause may be considered a means of allo-
cating unknown or undeterminable risks between two contracting par-
ties. Arguably, in a Gore-type situation the parties are merely allocating
this burden. The seed retailer sells his goods at a relatively low price
because he is not guaranteeing them. The farmer is willing to accept
virtually any risk in order to avoid having to pay a higher price for the
seeds. Some courts have been persuaded by this logic and have conse-
quently upheld limitation-of-damages clauses in seed-sale cases." For
example, in Hoover v. Utah Nursery Co. 5 the court reasoned that
[t]he purchase price of a parcel of seed is usually insignificant as
compared with the value of the crop that may be raised therefrom. For
this small price the seed merchant may feel that he cannot afford to
warrant. Crops are destroyed or impaired by many causes, [some of
which are] hard to identify. The law, considering these larger facts and
circumstances, gives validity to these disclaimers .... 46
In Gore the North Carolina Supreme Court did not mention these
considerations, perhaps recognizing that there was no mutually under-
stood, bargained-for allocation of the risk. Any pre-litigation thought
as to who should bear the burden apparently was engaged in only by
the retailer, who had drafted the provision. The buyer probably never
even considered the question. The Gore court, by invalidating the
limitation-of-damages clause, may have been making a policy decision
that as between the two parties the seed retailer was better able to
absorb the cost of accepting the risks.
11279 N.C. at 202, 182 S.E.2d at 395.
1132 N.J. at 404, 161 A.2d at 95.
"E.g., Asgrow Seed Co. v. Gulick, 420 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); Hoover v. Utah
Nursery Co., 79 Utah 12, 7 P.2d 270 (1932).
179 Utah 12, 7 P.2d 270 (1932).
'Id. at 17, 7 P.2d at 273.
19721
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Two other courts recently presented with cases quite similar to
Gore ruled that the limitation-of-damages clause was against public
policy.47 These decisions did not go nearly as far as Gore, however,
because in each case the defendant was found to have been culpable in
some degree. In one instance the seed grower was actually negligent,48
and in the other, he fraudulently misrepresented the kind and quality
of the seeds.49 In contrast, the defendant in Gore was free of fault. The
result of the court's decision in Gore is that seed growers and retailers
are strictly liable for selling mislabeled products in North Carolina.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, now in force in this state, the
seller by labeling his seeds to be a specific variety has given an express
warranty of description 0 that may not be disclaimed by any inconsistent
terms in the sales contract.51 While the Code permits contractual limita-
tion of damages, the Gore opinion would forbid such a modification, at
least if the damages were limited to the return of purchase price. Thus,
under the Code, a seed seller may not disclaim his liability for breach
of an express warranty and under Gore he may not limit his damages.
ERNEST S. DELANEY, III
Securities Regulation-A Little Light and More Obfuscation on Rule
10b-5
For a decade or more there has been a prolific development of
federal case law involving private actions based on violations of section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934' and of the implementing
41Klein v. Asgrow Seed Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 87, 54 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1966); Dessert Seed Co.
v. Drew Farmers Supply, Inc., 248 Ark. 858, 454 S.W.2d 307 (1970). In Dessert Seed the court
stated that the limitation-of-damages clause was "unreasonable, unconscionable, and against sound
public policy." Id. at 865, 454 S.W.2d at 311 (emphasis added).48Dessert Seed Co. v. Drew Farmers Supply, Inc., 248 Ark. 858, 865, 454 S.W.2d 307, 311
(1970).
"'Klein v. Asgrow Seed Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 87, -, 54 Cal. Rptr. 609, 618 (1966).
-UCC § 2-313(i)(b).
51See UCC § 2-316(1); UCC § 316, Comment 1; UCC § 2-313, Comments 1, 4.
'15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). The portion of the statute relevant to this discussion reads as
follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
706 [Vol. 50
